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ABSTRACT
        An experimental and calculational study has been performed to understand and prevent inadvertent activation of
the criticality alarm system (CAS) from fuel-handling operations at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility.  In
conjunction with the study, the CAS neutron detectors were tested to verify the design specifications for gamma
rejection capability and zero response limit.  A minimum physical restrictive boundary around the CAS location was
established based on a gamma ray dose rate limit of 10 rad/hr.  The canister loaded with spent nuclear fuel must be
moved in the area outside the exclusion zone so as not to trigger a false alarm from the CAS detectors.  
I.  INTRODUCTION
        The purpose of a criticality alarm system (CAS)
is to reduce risk to personnel by detecting a criticality
event (neutron radiation) and actuating an alarm
system to initiate emergency response.  Inadvertent
criticality alarms from non-critical events, such as
spurious voltage spikes or intense gamma radiation
fields can result in work cessation, time-consuming
and costly event assessments, and potential harm to
personnel during a false evacuation. It therefore
becomes a major concern to ensure inadvertent or
false criticality alarms do not occur or at least are
minimized.  Minimization of inadvertent criticality
alarms due to intense gamma radiation emitted from
spent nuclear fuel elements as opposed to neutron
radiation from an actual criticality event is the
primary focus of this calculational and experimental
study.
        The Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) is a
government-owned, contractor-operated facility
located at the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), within the Idaho
Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center
(INTEC).  The mission of the facility is to provide
safe dry storage for various types of spent nuclear
fuels.  Some of the fuel types stored in the facility
include high burnup elements from the Advanced
Test Reactor (ATR), High Flux Beam Reactor
(HFBR), Experimental Breeder Reactor, Fort St.
Vrain and Peach Bottom commercial reactors, and
TRIGA reactors.  Although other fuel types (lower
burnup) are stored in the IFSF, it is these high-burnup
elements with the associated intense gamma radiation
fields that have the potential to inadvertently set off
the criticality alarms in the fuel-handling area
adjacent to the storage vault.
        Fuels requiring dry storage are received at the
IFSF in fuel shipping casks.  At the facility’s
receiving dock, the casks are removed from the
transport vehicle, positioned in a cask transport car,
and moved into the fuel-handling cave.  Typically, in
the fuel-handling cave, the cask lid is removed, and
individual fuel elements are extracted from the cask
and placed in special storage canisters.  It is during
the time period when fuel elements are extracted from
their casks or when fully loaded canisters are moved
in the cave that the CAS detectors are exposed to the
intense gamma radiation fields from the spent fuel.
II. CAS NEUTRON DETECTORS
        The IFSF fuel-handling cave is rectangular in
shape with 4.5 ft thick concrete walls.  On the north
wall is a leaded-glass-viewing window with two
manipulator ports on each side of the window that
penetrate the concrete wall.  The manipulators are no
longer in service and have been removed, leaving one
of the two cylindrical tube penetrations in the
concrete wall available for the placement of the
neutron detector cluster, which is part of the CAS. 
The other penetration is filled with lead shot to
prevent radiation streaming through the wall.  The
neutron detectors are designed such that fast neutrons
from a criticality event are thermalized by a
polyethylene moderator, strike the scintillator
detector material, and generate a light pulse.  The
cluster is composed of three scintillator tubes bound
tightly together in a lead sheath as shown in Figure 1.
The lead plug and sheath provide gamma radiation
shielding, but does not fully shield the tube axial
length circumferentially.  The top of the sheath is
open and can allow buildup of scattered gamma rays
that penetrate the concrete wall and strike the
scintillator material.  The CAS detector is designed
with a 10000:1 gamma rejection ratio and zero
response above background in gamma radiation fields
of ≤ 10 rad/hr.
III.  DETECTOR GAMMA RESPONSE
       The three neutron detectors of the CAS cluster
were first individually tested to verify the design
specifications for gamma rejection capability and test
the zero response limit.  The detectors were subjected
to two different gamma-ray-emitting sources of
known strength, Ir-192 and Cs-137.  The Ir-192
source emits gamma rays in the range of 0.296-0.468
MeV and the Cs-137 source has a gamma ray peak at
0.662 MeV.  The local gamma dose rates experienced
by the detectors were varied by carefully changing the
distance between the source and the detector.  For the
Cs-137 tests, all three detectors passed the zero
response to gamma fields exceeding 10 rad/hr.  One
detector did not register a response until subjected to
a field of greater than 40 rad/hr.  Another detector
responded just over 10 rad/hr.  This indicates some
variation in the individual detector gamma rejection
capability, but all three met the vendor specification. 
       The second test source, Ir-192, is not a vendor
specified gamma ray source.  One detector was tested
and found to respond to a field intensity in the 3-5
rad/hr range.  The background radiation level
consistently registered 3-4 mrad/hr and when the
Ir-192 produced a 3.85 rad/hr field in the vicinity of
the detector, the detector registered a 34 mrad/hr
response.  The neutron detector did not pass the
vendor specification limits at this gamma ray energy
indicating some nonlinear response as a function of
energy.  Also, it is important to note that the CAS
detector with a set point of 20 mrad/hr would have
inadvertently alarmed for this situation. 
      In addition, the Ir-192 source test indicated
extreme non-linearity in the gamma rejection ratio as
shown in Figure 2.  (Distance between the source and
the detector is given in inches.)  At high external
gamma field intensities, the gamma rejection was
approximately 10:1.  At 6 rad/hr, the gamma rejection
increased to approximately 100:1.  At 5 rad/hr, the
ratio increased to 1000:1.  Beyond this point, an
accurate calculation of the ratio was not possible
because the Data Acquisition System (DAS) reading
was a steady background count rate. The measured
ratio was considerably less than the 10,000:1 gamma
rejection ratio.  
IV.  ANALYSIS
        In order to evaluate the gamma-ray intensity and
spectrum that the CAS neutron detector cluster is
exposed to, two separate calculational studies were
performed.  The first calculation involved the
determination of a bounding spent fuel gamma-ray
source term.  The second calculation was a
parametric study involving gamma-ray transport from
a canister loaded with spent fuel elements to the CAS
detectors and determine the dose rate at the detectors
as a function of distance and angle between the
canister and the CAS concrete wall.  From the second
calculation, an exclusion zone was established. (i.e.,
calculated dose rate had to be  10 rad/hr). 
        A variety of spent nuclear fuel elements that
have varying magnitude of burnup and decay time are
expected during the course of fuel movement into the
fuel-handling cave.  Gamma ray source spectrum for
each fuel type is calculated using ORIGEN2 based on
detailed burnup history of the fuel.1 The gamma flux-
to-dose conversion factors are based on ANSI/ANS-
6.1.1-1977.  In order to encompass all spent nuclear
fuels, a hypothetical ATR maximum burnup fuel
element was used in the calculations.  ORIGEN2 was
used to perform the fuel depletion calculation for the
single ATR fuel element.  The ATR fuel element was
assumed to have a burnup of 367.2 MWD (megawatt-
days) followed by 11.5-year ex-core decay.  The
resulting gamma-ray source spectrum from this
calculation was then used as the source term for
gamma transport calculations. 
        The individual fuel and the canister were
modeled using the three-dimensional Monte Carlo
code, MCNP.2 The single spent ATR fuel element
and a canister loaded with eight ATR elements were
explicitly modeled using MCNP. 
       A third calculation was also performed in order
to add confidence in the analytical methodology. 
Gamma-ray dose rates from previously measured
spent fuel elements were available for this
verification check.  Four Advanced Reactivity
Measurement Facility (ARMF) spent fuel elements
had measured surface dose rates of 1.18, 2.0, 2.0, and
1.5 rad/hr.  Using detailed MCNP geometry models
of the ARMF element and a detailed power history,
the calculated dose rate values ranged from 1.3 to 1.7
rad/hr, indicating good agreement between the
measured data and the calculated dose rate values.  
V.  EXCLUSION ZONE
    A solution to prevent inadvertent activation of
criticality alarms involves setting up an exclusion
zone around the CAS detectors.  Centered about the
CAS and extending from the north wall into the fuel-
handling cave and from the cave ceiling to an
elevation below the detector level, the exclusion zone
boundaries and dimensions were determined
analytically.  Individual elements or loaded canisters
would be prohibited from entering the exclusion
zone. 
      Based on the Ir-192 gamma source test, a limit of
4 rad/hr at the detectors was initially used as a basis
for determining the exclusion zone boundary.  This
limit was later increased to the vendor specified 10
rad/hr considering that the gamma ray spectra of the
spent nuclear fuels are similar to that of Cs-137 rather
than Ir-192. 
        An experimental test of the exclusion zone was
actually performed in the IFSF fuel-handling cave
with a canister loaded with two ATR fuel buckets and
one HFBR fuel bucket.  The CAS was not activated
for the canister placed adjacent to the north concrete
wall of the fuel-handling cave.  The calculated dose
rate, 17.9 ± 0.8 rad/hr, was higher than the limiting
dose rate, 10 rad/hr, but still did not cause any false
alarm to the CAS detectors.  The dose rate obtained
from an independent calculation was 18.4 ± 1.5
rad/hr, which gave further confidence in the analytical
modeling and calculational method.  
        The parametric dose rate calculations were
performed by varying the spacing between the
concrete wall and the canister, and by varying the
height relative to the canister position and the CAS
elevation.  A minimum physical boundary was
established to envelop all of the fuel types moved
through the fuel- handling cave.  The exclusion zone
is 8 ft from the concrete wall and 8 ft wide on both
sides of the CAS detector position as shown in Figure
3.  The calculated gamma ray dose rate at the CAS
detectors is less than 10 rad/hr for spent fuel outside
the exclusion zone, and within the exclusion zone, the
dose rates would be greater than 10 rad/hr.  The
canister must be moved in the area outside this
exclusion boundary so as not to trigger a false alarm
from the CAS detectors.  
VI.  CONCLUSION
       The minimum physical boundary, 8 ft from the
concrete wall and 8 ft on both sides of the CAS
detector position, enveloped all of the fuel types
moved through the fuel-handling cave.  
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Figure 1.  CAS Neutron Detector Assembly
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Figure 2.  Gamma Rejection Ratio for Ir-192
Figure 3.  Exclusion Zone Boundary
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